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ABSTRACT 
 
Labor Mobility, Social Network Effects, and Innovative Activity* 
 
We study the mapping between labor mobility and industrial innovative activity for the 
population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004. Our study 
documents a positive relationship between the number of workers who join a firm and the 
firm’s innovative activity. This relationship is stronger if workers join from innovative firms. We 
also find evidence for positive feedback from workers who leave for an innovative firm, 
presumably because the worker who left stays in contact with their former colleagues. This 
implies that the positive feedback (“social network effects”) that has been found by other 
studies not only exists but even outweighs the disruption and loss of knowledge occurring to 
the previous employer from the worker leaving. Summing up the effects of joining and leaving 
workers, we find ample evidence for mobility to be associated with an increase in total 
innovative activity of the new and the old employer. 
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1 Introduction
There is by now evidence from surveys (Manseld, 1985; Zander and Kogut,
1995), patent les (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Song et al., 2003), and litiga-
tion (Hoti et al., 2006) showing that labor mobility is an important source of
inter-rm knowledge transfer. Firms are aware of the opportunities that mo-
bility creates and hire inventors to acquire technological competencies and to
enter distant technological areas (Palomeras and Melero, 2009; Rosenkopf and
Almeida, 2003; Singh and Agrawal, 2011). They also hire expert managers to
introduce new types of products (Boeker, 1997; Rao and Drazin, 2002). Firms
experiencing worker exit may, however, encounter a loss of skills and knowledge
| or knowledge exclusivity | that reduces their competitiveness, sometimes
to the extent of threatening rm survival (Wezel et al., 2006).
A related body of literature has studied the regional eects of labor mobility.
The focus has been primarily on the world's most successful high-tech cluster,
Silicon Valley, where Almeida and Kogut (1999) and Fallick et al. (2006) have
documented the co-existence of high labor turnover and localized knowledge
sharing among rms.1 Saxenian (1994) stresses how the \job-hopping" culture
in Silicon Valley creates tightly coupled social networks through which knowl-
edge ows. This view is supported by recent works showing that rms learn
from workers who have left, presumably because they stay in contact with their
former colleagues (Agrawal et al., 2006; Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010).2
The research on labor mobility is motivated by the notion that knowledge
sharing is a powerful source of innovation and economic growth at the regional
level. Codied knowledge is non-rival in nature, and one rm using a piece of
knowledge does not prevent other rms from using it at the same time (Ar-
row, 1962). While the positive eects of knowledge sharing certainly arise if
the knowledge ows are pure externalities, as envisioned in economic growth
literature, this is less obviously the case if knowledge travels embodied within
workers. The disruptive eect of worker exit together with the loss of skills
and knowledge might decrease the level of innovation by the old employer to
such an extent that it outweighs the positive eect on innovation by the new
employer. A key question in this debate is therefore whether labor mobility is
associated with an increase in total innovation by the rms involved. And if it
is, the question is how strong these eects are. This paper sets out to answer
both of these questions.
Previewing our results, we nd a signicant and positive eect of labor
mobility on the rms' joint level of invention.3 The eect is composed of a
strictly positive eect on the level of invention by the new employer and either
1Breschi and Lissoni (2005, 2009) show that knowledge sharing being localized is primarily explained
by workers being geographically immobile.
2In a dierent context, Singh (2007) nds bidirectional knowledge ows between multinational compa-
nies (MNCs) and host country organisations.
3As our measure of R&D output is patent applications, we will use the word inventions rather than
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a positive or no eect - depending on the new employer's type - on the level
of invention by the old employer. This represents to our knowledge the rst
rm-level evidence showing that labor mobility increases the aggregate level of
invention.
Our empirical ndings derive from an extensive data set that combines
patent applications by Danish rms to the European Patent Oce (EPO) with
matched employer{employee register data that contain an essentially complete
record of mobility in the Danish labor market. This data set allows us to esti-
mate the change in the number of inventions, measured by patent applications,
associated with labor mobility. We consider the eect of worker mobility on the
levels of invention of the two rms involved, the new and the old employer, and
allow for bidirectional knowledge ows. Summing up these eects, we obtain
the net eect of labor mobility on invention.
The point of departure of our empirical approach is a standard rm{level
patent production function (Hall et al., 1986; Hausman et al., 1984) that maps
the dierent types of labor, capital and other observed rm characteristics into
patent counts. We focus on workers with a university degree in natural sciences,
engineering and other technical elds and analyze the eects of mobility of such
workers when employed in positions classied as using or producing knowledge
at an advanced level.4
Our results are consistent with the previous literature showing that workers
bring knowledge and skills that increase the level of invention by the new em-
ployer. Firms are divided into \patenting" and \non-patenting" types according
to their stock of previous patent applications being positive or not. A worker
coming from a patenting rm is, according to our estimates, associated with
an increase in the number of patent applications by the new employer of 0.034.
A worker coming from a non-patenting rm is associated with an increase of
around two thirds of that (0.022).5 The economic signicance of those numbers
can be assessed by relating them to an average number of 0.76 patents per year
by rms that have patented prior to the beginning of our sample period.
Although the positive eect of hirings on innovation is well-established by
now, a couple of things must be noted regarding these results. Firstly, most ex-
isting studies use patent les to trace mobility, and the subjects of the analysis
are therefore by construction \star scientists" who invent repeatedly. Instead of
this, we consider the eect of mobility by an average worker who possesses the
formal qualications necessary to perform R&D. Thus, the magnitude of the
eects that we nd should be interpreted in view of the fact that our denition
of R&D workers is fairly inclusive. Furthermore, as we have a complete record
innovations when referring to our empirical results.
4According to the International Standard Classication of Occupations by the International Labour
Organization (ILO).
5The marginal eects reported in the introduction are evaluated for the average rm with at least one
pre-sample patent.
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of mobility, we avoid the possible biases arising from unregistered moves.6 Sec-
ondly, with the notable exception of Hoisl (2007), this is the only study on the
eects of mobility on invention output rather than invention input as measured
by citations in later patent applications of the new or the old employer.
An important novelty of this paper is that we are able to estimate the eects
of leavers. We nd that a worker leaving for a patenting rm is associated with
an increase in the number of patent applications by the old employer of 0.016.
A worker who left for a non-patenting rm has no signicant concomitant eect
on patenting. It is an interesting and somewhat surprising result that a worker
leaving for a patenting rm is associated with an increase in the level of invention
of their old rm. This suggests that reverse knowledge ows not only exist, as
Agrawal et al. (2006) as well as Corredoira and Rosenkopf (2010) have shown
looking at patent citations, but are suciently important to outweigh negative
eects resulting from worker exit.
Our analysis provides strong support to the view that mobility of high-
skilled workers stimulates the total level of invention of the rms involved in
the move, and the eect is stronger if the rms are of the patenting types.
Hence, mobility between two patenting rms has the largest marginal eect
(0.050 = 0.034 + 0.016) on patent counts. Mobility between two non-patenting
rms has a slightly positive eect, albeit statistically insignicant.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section
reviews the related literature. Section 2 details the hypotheses tested and the
theory underlying them. Section 3 describes the data and outlines the deni-
tions used in the analysis. Section 4 characterizes our econometric approach
and provides descriptive statistics. The main results are reported in Section 5,
along with certain robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Several studies have used patent data to analyze the importance of mobility for
innovation. Song et al. (2003) as well as Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) show
that rms are more likely to cite patents produced by the inventors' former
employers in their patent applications, which is evidence of forward knowl-
edge ows. Agrawal et al. (2006) as well as Corredoira and Rosenkopf (2010)
demonstrate the existence of reverse knowledge ows by showing that the old
employer is also more likely to cite the patents of the worker's new employer
in its later patent applications. An important dierence to these papers is that
they measure the eects of knowledge sharing from the input side of the in-
vention process - the knowledge that goes into the creation of new inventions -
whereas we measure it from the output side. Hoisl (2007) is to our knowledge
6If patent les are used to track mobility, a move that did not result in a patent application at the new
employer is unregistered.
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the only other paper that measures the eects of labor mobility on invention
output. She combines data on mobility from patent les with background infor-
mation about the inventors gained from questionnaires. Her ndings show that
mobile inventors are on average more productive, and that mobility increases
inventor productivity. However, as she does not measure the patent productiv-
ity of the previous employer, she cannot address the eect of mobility on the
total level of invention.
In a study that investigates the eects of both labor mobility and member-
ship in a large and partly publicly-sponsored research joint venture in nanotech-
nology, Cassiman et al. (2011) show that hiring workers who have previously
been employed at this institution does not generally lead to signicant changes
in the innovativeness of the hiring rms. Instead, active participation in the
research joint venture (\buying a spot in the lab") does indeed lead to econom-
ically and statistically signicant positive eects on industrial innovation.
Another approach to documenting knowledge sharing through labor mobil-
ity has been to test dierent theoretical predictions. Kim and Marschke (2005)
show that rms have a higher propensity to patent in regions with high labor
mobility. This is consistent with a theory in which rms patent their inventions
to prevent misappropriation by former employees. Human capital theory pre-
dicts that workers who acquire valuable knowledge on the job receive a wage
premium but pay for this through an initial wage discount. Men (2005) nds
evidence of such a wage prole, whereas Maliranta et al. (2009) nd that work-
ers are not able to capitalize on the knowledge acquired as R&D workers.
Finally, Toivanen and Vaananen (2008) combine Finnish patent data with
linked employer{employee data. They nd a signicant and potentially long{
lasting wage premium for inventors of granted patents, indicating that these
workers are perceived by rms as possessing valuable knowledge and skills.
Again, our approach diers from this line of research as the aim is not to demon-
strate that labor mobility leads to knowledge sharing among rms. Rather, we
take this as a well-established fact and try instead to measure the importance
of this phenomenon for invention.
3 Theoretical Motivation and Hypotheses
In this section, we derive the hypotheses that we subsequently test in the empir-
ical analysis. We consider the eect of labor mobility on the level of invention
and refer to the parties involved in a move as the \old employer", the \new
employer" and the \worker". We denote knowledge that travels from the old
to the new employer as \forward knowledge ow", as it moves in the same
direction as the worker, and knowledge that travels in the opposite direction
is denoted as \reverse knowledge ow". It is useful to make the distinction
between two types of knowledge that a worker can possess, namely \explicit
knowledge" and \intellectual human capital". Explicit knowledge is codiable
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and can be transmitted to others at low costs. It is thus non-rival in nature,
and one rm using a piece of explicit knowledge does not prevent other rms
from using it at the same time (Arrow, 1962; David, 1992). Following Zucker et
al. (1998), intellectual human capital is dened as knowledge that is embedded
in a worker's human capital and that | due to its complexity or tacitness |
cannot be easily communicated and shared.
Most economic analyses of knowledge sharing through labor mobility have
conceptualized workers as depositories of knowledge. A worker acquires explicit
knowledge and intellectual human capital while working for the old employer
and brings it to the new employer; see, e.g., Pakes and Nitzan (1983) as well
as Kim and Marschke (2005). Labor mobility results therefore in a forward
knowledge ow from the old to the new employer. The old employer experiences
a loss of the worker's intellectual human capital as well as any explicit knowledge
that is private to the worker.
Inter-organizational social networks are another important channel for the
diusion of knowledge (Coleman et al., 1957; Dahl and Pedersen, 2004; Powell
et al., 1996), and labor mobility also increases knowledge sharing by changing
the structure of social networks in which the rm is embedded. Applying a
network perspective, rms can be seen as the nodes of the social network and
the enduring social relationships between the workers as the ties. Assuming that
a worker stays in contact with her former colleagues, labor mobility establishes
new ties between two nodes of the network, the new and the old employer.
Since relationships between former colleagues are likely to be characterized by
trust and reciprocity, the ties represent channels through which ideas, problem
solutions and other types of knowledge are exchanged (von Hippel, 1987). The
new ties formed by the labor move may also reduce the distance to other nodes
in the network, increasing both the new and the old employer's knowledge
exchange with other rms in the network (Breschi and Lissoni, 2005; Singh,
2005).
The social ties provide the new employer with access to knowledge that is
located at the old employer, or at other rms, and that the worker moving does
not possess. The forward knowledge ow arising from labor mobility is therefore
reinforced by the establishment of social ties. Interestingly, the social network
perspective also introduces the possibility of reverse knowledge ows, because
the new ties formed allow the employees of the old employer to tap into the
knowledge available at the new employer (Agrawal et al., 2006; Corredoira and
Rosenkopf, 2010).
To sum up, labor mobility results in an inow of knowledge to the new em-
ployer. Since knowledge is a key input in the production of new inventions,
we would therefore expect labor mobility to be associated with greater inven-
tion by the new employer. Furthermore, the forward knowledge ows should
be greater the more new knowledge is available at the old employer. In the
empirical analysis, invention performance is measured by the number of patent
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applications.7 Moreover, we proxy the amount of new knowledge available at a
rm by dividing rms into two groups: \patenting rms" with a positive stock
of previous patents and \non-patenting rms" without such previous patent ap-
plications. Measuring the theoretical variables in this way, the rst hypothesis
is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: A. Labor mobility is associated with a higher number of patent
applications made by the new employer.
B. The eect is larger if the old employer is a patenting rm.
The net eect of labor mobility on the old employer's invention performance
is a priori ambiguous, because the old employer loses the worker's intellectual
human capital and any explicit knowledge private to the worker but receives
a reverse knowledge ow. Still, arguing as above, we would expect the reverse
knowledge ow to be larger when the worker leaves for a patenting rm than
when she leaves for a non-patenting rm:
Hypothesis 2: The eect of labor mobility on the number of patent applica-
tions made by the old employer is larger if the new employer is a patenting
rm.
In order to derive our hypothesis regarding the eect of labor mobility on
the joint level of invention of the rms, it is useful to start from an assumption
of a competitive and frictionless labor market. In such a market, labor mobility
occurs if and only if it increases the joint prots of the rms involved; see, e.g.,
Fosfuri et al. (2001). The reason for this is that the rm that values the worker
the most will oer the highest wage. Hence, mobility occurs if the gain of the
potential new employer from hiring the worker outweighs the loss of the current
employer from losing the worker.
There are two opposing eects of labor mobility on the joint prots of the
rms (Combes and Duranton, 2006; Fosfuri and Rnde, 2004). Firstly, a certain
amount of knowledge that was in the sole possession of one of the rms before
mobility occurred is now shared. Therefore, the prots of the rm that loses
knowledge exclusivity is reduced. It will face more competition for some com-
mercial uses of the knowledge. Since competition destroys rents, the rm that
receives the knowledge gains less from entering into these commercial uses than
what is lost by the rm that loses knowledge exclusivity. This eect tends to
reduce the joint prots of the rm and to prevent labor mobility from occurring.
Secondly, rms have dierent R&D capabilities and strengths, and knowledge
sharing increases the likelihood that a piece of knowledge will serve as an input
in the creation of new knowledge and inventions (Bessen and Maskin, 2009).
7As part of a robustness check, we also weight patent applications by the number of forward citations
that they receive in order to control for quality dierences. We expect knowledge sharing to increase both
the number and quality of the inventions made. Therefore, the hypotheses developed below also hold if
the dependent variable is citation-weighted patent applications.
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Indeed, this is the main argument as to why knowledge sharing fosters invention
and sustained economic growth. Therefore, knowledge sharing through labor
mobility has the potential to stimulate invention, be it in the form of more vari-
ety, higher success probability, or greater speed of invention. This second eect
increases the joint prots of the rms and tends to facilitate labor mobility.
These arguments imply that labor mobility occurs if the positive eect from
a higher level of invention is suciently strong enough to outweigh the negative
eect from more competition. Put dierently, an increase in the joint invention
of the rms is a necessary condition for labor mobility to occur. Again, we
expect the forward and the reverse knowledge ow to be greater if the old
employer and the new employer, respectively, are patenting rms. This leads
to our third and main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: A. Labor mobility is associated with an increase in the total
number of patent applications made by the new and the old employer.
B. The eect is larger if the new employer and if the old employer are
patenting rms.
Some comments relating to Hypothesis 3 must be noted. To begin with,
note that mobility could possibly reduce invention if it would be very disrup-
tive for the old employer, or if it would result in a less ecient allocation of
the worker's intellectual human capital. However, labor mobility would then
unambiguously reduce the rms' joint prots, and we should not observe labor
mobility occurring. Secondly, the argument underlying the hypothesis does not
rely on mobility occurring exactly if it maximizes the rms' joint prots, a re-
sult that is sensitive to, e.g., the introduction of labor market frictions. Rather,
the central and robust argument is that mobility takes place if the negative
eect from tougher competition is dominated by the positive eect on the joint
level of invention. Finally, strong protection of intellectual property (IP) shields
rms from product market competition that would otherwise arise from knowl-
edge sharing by preventing imitation. Hence, we expect strong IP protection
to increase labor turnover, because it reduces the downside of mobility. The
argument behind Hypothesis 3 holds, however, irrespective of the strength of
the IP protection.
4 Data
Data on all patent applications to the EPO that were led for between 1978
and 2006 by at least one applicant with Danish residency constitute the core of
our data set. This data was retrieved from EPO's \PATSTAT" database.8 We
consider patent applications up to and including 2004 in our analysis, since the
8For information on this data set, refer to http://www.epo.org/patents/patent-information/raw-
data/test/product-14-24.html.
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database for the years following this date is not complete. This includes 12,873
patent applications.
Patent applications are used rather than patent grants because the average
grant time at the EPO of four to ve years (Kaiser and Schneider, 2005) implies
that a substantial number of patents applied for during the time period con-
sidered for estimation (2000{2004) would be lost if patent grants were used.9
The \time stamp" of the patent applications is the \priority date", the date
on which the invention was rst led for patent protection at the EPO or any
national patent oce.
The EPO data do not come with a unique rm identication number of the
type used by Statistics Denmark, the provider of our rm{level and employee{
level data. Therefore, we attached our EPO data | mostly manually | to
Statistics Denmark's rm identiers. We could assign rm identiers to 11,280
patents. The unmatched applications primarily refer to rms that went out of
business before 1999. In any case, the corresponding information would have
been lost in our analysis, since our rm{level data starts in 1999.
These 11,280 patent applications were applied for by 2,448 unique patent
applicants that are neither private independent inventors nor foreign rms. Af-
ter having matched this data with our rm{level data, we are left with 11,031
patent applications accounted for by 2,278 unique rms.
Statistics Denmark provided us with rm registry data, most importantly
the sectoral and regional aliation of a rm and its book value of physical
capital, and with registry data on employee characteristics, most importantly
the end{of{November number of employees and their highest level of educa-
tion.10 We discard sectors with no EPO patent applications between 1978 and
2004. Sectors are dened according to the three{digit NACE Rev. 1 industrial
classication level. Firms that did not le for an application at the EPO in a
particular year are assigned a zero for the number of patent applications in that
year. In a nal step, we merge the rm{level data with employee{level data,
which allows us to track the employment history of each worker across rms.
We leave out rms that were founded during the estimation period 2000{2004.
This last restriction is caused by the choice of estimation method. As further
described in Section 5.2, we use a \pre{sample" estimator that requires informa-
tion on rms' patenting behavior prior to 2000. Finally, we discard rms from
the public sector, since their patenting behavior is likely to be very dierent
from that of private rms.
When delimited according to these criteria, there are 349,595 observations
on 93,725 rms among the population of private rms in Denmark. Our main
9There exists a reporting lag between the date of application and the date on which the application is
published in the EPO database. This implies that not all patents applied for after 2004 are registered in
the database at the time of data collection. We do not include such patents in order to avoid biases.
10As the rm aliation of a worker is registered only once a year in November, we do not observe
within{year mobility.
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sample consists of observations on rms that employ at least one worker in an
R&D{related occupation.11 This data represents the focus of our attention,
since rms with employees in R&D{related occupations are much more likely
to patent than rms without workers of this nature. Of the total number of
2,861 patent applications during 2000{2004 that could be denitively assigned
to a rm, 2,728 | or 95 percent | can be assigned to rms with positive R&D
employment. By excluding rms with very little or no current R&D activity, we
attempt to compare dierent varieties of apples rather than apples and oranges.
Our main estimation results thus include 42,507 observations on 14,516 unique
rms, and 2,728 patents over the period 2000{2004.
5 Empirical approach
This section describes the patent production function and outlines the econo-
metric approach that we employ in estimating the relationships between worker
mobility and rms' inventive output. We provide details on the treatment of
unobserved rm heterogeneity and state dependence in the analysis. In addi-
tion to our worker mobility terms, our econometric specication also includes
controls for rm size (total R&D employment, capital stock), sectoral alia-
tion (15 sectors), ve dierent geographical regions, and time eects. We lag
all explanatory variables except for the time, region and sector dummies by one
year. As part of a robustness check, we also use a two{period lag.
5.1 Patent production function
We assume a Cobb{Douglas functional form as it is standard procedure within
the literature (Hausman et al. 1984; Blundell et al. 1995). We dierentiate be-
tween R dierent types of workers in terms of mobility and in terms of having
(not) been employed by a patenting rm, or leaving a rm to join a patent-
ing/not patenting rm. We denote each share of workers sr = Lr=L, where L is
the total R&D workforce. Our dependent variable is the total number of patent
applications by rm i in a given year t which we denote by P . It is a count
variable that either takes on a value of 0 or a positive integer. We will hence
use count data models in the estimations which link the explanatory variables
to the dependent count variable in an exponential (or log{linear) way:
P = exp

ln(A) +  ln(K) +  ln(L) +
RX
r=2
rsr

: (1)
Labor category r = 1 constitutes our base category of R&D workers. Appendix
A provides details on the derivation of Equation (1).
11We provide details on our denition of R&D{related occupations in Section 5.3.
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The coecients in Equation (1) do not directly translate into marginal eects
as in a linear model. A positive (negative) coecient on worker group r indicates
that its estimated marginal contribution to patenting activity of rm i is greater
(smaller) than that of the base category. We present both coecient estimates
and marginal eects in our empirical analysis.
5.2 Econometric model
Count data models
Equation (1) can be directly estimated using count data models. The most
popular model for count data is the Poisson regression (Cameron and Trivedi
1998; Winkelmann 2008). The basic Poisson regression model assumes equality
of the conditional mean of the dependent variable and its conditional variance.
A common empirical observation in patent data is, however, that the conditional
variance is greater than the conditional mean, which implies over{dispersion
(Cincera 1997). The variance restriction does not have to be fullled to obtain
consistent estimates of the parameters in the Poisson model, but more ecient
estimates can be found by specifying a more exible relationship between the
mean and the variance. We hence consider a Negative Binomial (NegBin) model
which does allow for over{dispersion.12
The pre{sample mean estimator
In panel data of the type we study, the presence of rm{specic variables that
the econometrician does not observe but aect patenting activity like e.g. per-
manent dierences in appropriability conditions of R&D investments or dierent
technological opportunities is not uncommon.
In a series of papers, Blundell et al. (1995, 1999, 2002) propose the \pre{
sample mean estimator" (PSME), a count data method used to directly account
for unobserved permanent heterogeneity through additional historic information
on the dependent variable. We shall apply their estimator to our data. The idea
is to approximate rm-specic, time{invariant heterogeneity by using informa-
tion on a rm's patenting behavior prior to the start of the estimation period.
In our particular context, we possess data on any rm's patent activity from
1978 onwards, while our explanatory variables (allowing for lags) are observed
after 1999 only.
Specically, the Blundell et al. pre{sample mean estimator uses the average
of the dependent variable over the pre{sample period as a proxy for the cor-
related xed eect for each rm. Since a prominent feature of our data is an
overall increase in the level of patenting during the pre{sample period from 1978
to 1999, we extend the estimator by normalizing a rm's number of patents in
a pre{sample year by the total number of patents applied for during that year.
We provide details on this normalization in Appendix B.
Many of the rms in our data never applied for a single patent. We again
12We implement this estimator in Stata by the nbreg procedure with the dispersion (constant) option.
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follow Blundell et al. (1995, 1999) and include a dummy variable for rms
having applied for at least one patent during the pre{sample period. This
variable also acts as a remedy for the so{called \zero{ination problem" that is
common to many analyses of economic count data (Mullahy, 1997).13 Our nal
specication of the xed eect includes the dummy variable for pre{sample
patenting and the natural logarithm of the trend-corrected number of pre{
sample patents.14
State dependence
In addition to unobserved permanent dierences between rms, it is also com-
monly argued that past patenting outcomes may have an eect on present
patenting activities. Blundell et al. (1995), for example, argue that a rm's
stock of past patents represent knowledge from which future patentable ideas
can be derived. This would be evidence of positive state dependence in patent-
ing. Crepon and Duguet (1997), on the contrary, point to the fact that applying
for a patent in year t will prevent the rm from applying for the same patent in
year t+1, essentially diluting its stock of patentable ideas. This would suggest
negative state dependence.
To capture state dependence, Blundell et al. introduce a measure of a rm's
patenting history into the estimating equation, namely the discounted stock of
patents which gives a lower weight to more distant periods. Due to the relative
short time span of our estimation sample, this measure is highly correlated
with the pre-sample mean of the number of patents. Like Crepon and Duguet
(1997), we therefore use a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a rm
patented at t  1 as our control for state dependence.
5.3 Variable denitions
Denition of R&D workers
We dene R&D workers as those workers within a rm who are likely to be en-
gaged in R&D related tasks. Specically, we apply two main criteria to identify
the relevant group of workers.15 The rst criterion is that the person must hold
a bachelor, master, or Ph.D. degree in technical or natural sciences, veterinary
13We prefer our approach over the alternative zero ination model since our model belongs to the
family of linear{exponential models which are shown to produce consistent estimates under a large set
of circumstances (Winkelmann, Ch. 3, 2008). Further, Staub and Winkelmann (2009) demonstrate that
zero{ination models are, unlike the Poisson and the NegBin model, not robust to mis{specication of the
data-generating process.
14The number of pre{sample patents is replaced by a small number if the prior patent count is zero.
15Additional and somewhat straightforward criteria are that the individual must not be retired, be
between 20 and 75 years old and be employed by a Danish rm (since we only have data on Danish rms
at our disposal).
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and agricultural sciences, or health sciences.16 This criterion originates from
the idea that knowledge ows are mainly associated with the mobility of high{
skilled workers. The denition corresponds closely to the ndings of Kaiser
(2006) who uses patent inventor survey (PATVAL) data to show that Danish
inventors are likely to hold a bachelor's degree or higher. More precisely, 30.5
percent of the inventors hold a bachelor's degree, 40.8 percent a master's degree
and 17.4 percent a Ph.D. degree. We intend to capture all persons who possess
the formal skills necessary to perform R&D related activities within the rm.
Some high-skilled workers may, however, never perform actual R&D tasks.
We introduce the additional criterion that a person's job function must in-
volve use or production of knowledge at an advanced level. This information is
included in our data by way of the International Standard Classication of Oc-
cupations (ISCO) code, which is prepared by the International Labour Organi-
zation.17 At its rst{digit level, ISCO classies dierent occupations depending
on their knowledge content. In particular, we can distinguish between \pro-
fessionals" (level 2) and \technicians and associate professionals" (level 3).18
Individuals are categorized in the former group if they work in a position in
which they \increase the existing stock of knowledge, apply scientic or artistic
concepts and theories, teach about the foregoing in a systematic manner, or en-
gage in any combination of these three activities." We denote this group \R&D
professionals". They will be the focus of our analysis of mobility as they are
most likely to be directly involved in the creation of new knowledge. Individuals
categorized as technicians and associate professionals occupy support positions
that are more directed towards utilizing already existing knowledge. We refer
to this group as \R&D support workers". As they are not directly engaged in
developing new knowledge, they are not expected to be the main carriers of
knowledge between rms. The share of support workers in a rm is therefore
included in our model as a control variable only.
To summarize, we dene R&D professionals as individuals who hold a tech-
nical or scientic degree and perform job functions with an advanced knowledge
content. R&D support workers have similar formal skills but are currently em-
ployed in positions with less emphasis on the creation of new knowledge. Jointly,
these two groups constitute the current stock of R&D workers within the rm.
Mobility
We next characterize dierent categories of R&D professionals according to their
mobility status. We dierentiate between three categories of joiners to rm i in
16The health sciences category includes many general practitioners and hospital doctors who a priori are
not expected to perform R&D related activities. Most of these will be excluded in our estimations since
we exclude the public sector.
17http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/intro.htm
18We include R&D managers (ISCO 1237) in the group of professionals. The codes are very detailed
but a change in the way individuals were classied in 2003 prevents us from using more narrowly dened
occupations consistently over time.
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year t: The main group, which we simply term joiners, are workers who have
been employed at another rm l in year t  1 (and hence were not employed at
rm i in year t 1). Graduates are workers who meet the criteria for being R&D
professionals at time t and graduated between t   1 and t. Other joiners are
workers whose job market status in year t 1 is unknown but who are employed
by rm i in year t. Stayers are R&D professionals who are employed by rm i
both at time t  1 and t. They constitute the base category in our model.
A nal group of R&D professionals as distinguished by mobility status in our
model is the group of leavers. They were employed at rm i in year t 1 and are
now employed at a dierent rm j in year t. In order to test for social network
eects as discussed in Section 3, we further dierentiate this group according
to the level of innovativeness of their new employer. We proxy the level of
innovativeness by the previous patenting success of the rm. Specically, we
interact the leaver variable with a dummy variable for the new employer having
a non-zero historic patent count.
Using the same logic, we introduce two categories of joiners to rm i accord-
ing to the previous patenting status of the old employer l.
5.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the variables involved in our estima-
tions. It dierentiates between observations (rm{years) related to rms with
and without patents prior to the beginning of the estimation period. They are
denoted as pre{sample patenters and non-patenters, respectively. Around 6.6
percent of the sample comprises observations on pre{sample patenters.
Firms in our data are selected from the general population of rms by having
a positive number of R&D workers. Nevertheless, the average rm is fairly small,
having about eight R&D employees and a capital stock of about 78 mio. DKK
(the median, however, is 2.7 mio. DKK only).19 The overall level of patenting is
fairly low. The average rm applies for 0.06 patents per year within the sample
period. As expected, there are pronounced dierences between pre{sample
patenters and non-patenters in terms of rm size and their within-sample patent
output. While rms in the former group employ 39 R&D workers on average
and produce 0.76 patent applications per year, the corresponding gures for
rms without pre-sample patents are ve workers and 0.02 applications . The
composition of the R&D workforce in terms of professionals and support workers
is fairly similar. Pre-sample patenters employ on average 42 percent of their
R&D workforce in supporting positions against 46 percent for non-patenters.
The main focus of our analysis is the mobility of R&D professionals. The
overall level of mobility is high, with the four groups of joiners (from patenting
rms, from non-patenting rms, graduates, other joiners) constituting about
20 percent of the current year's employment of R&D professionals (joiners and
19One U.S. dollar corresponds roughly to 5.3 DKK.
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stayers). Analogously, this also holds true for pre-sample patenters and non-
patenters. A high mobility rate is in keeping with the nding that Danish labor
mobility rates are among the highest in OECD conutries, as documented by
Eriksson and Westergard-Nielsen (2009).
Whereas the overall level of mobility is comparable between pre-sample
patenters and non-patenters, there are clear dierences in terms of the ori-
gins of rm joiners and the destinations of leavers. More than one in every four
rm joiners come from a patenting rm in the sample of pre-sample patenters:
for pre-sample non-patenters, this gure is less than one in seven. A similar
dierence can be observed on the leaver side, with approximately one in three
(one in seven) of the leavers from pre-sample patenters (non-patenters) going
to a patenting rm.
Table 1 does not display pronounced dierences between rms with and
without pre{sample patents in terms of their regional distributions. The sectoral
distributions, on the other hand, show that certain sectors such as chemicals
(which includes biotech), machinery, electronics and instruments are slightly
overrepresented in the sub-sample of pre-sample patenters.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Appendix C displays a correlation table for the variables involved in our
estimations. It shows that our explanatory variables are moderately correlated.
This is conrmed by a variance ination factor of 1.86, which is well below the
critical value of 10 (Besley et al. 1980).
6 Results
Table 2 presents our NegBin PSME estimation results. The table contains two
sets of results. The rst specication is without controlling for the patenting
status of the old rm for joiners or the new rm for leavers. In the second
specication, we dierentiate both groups according to patenting status. This
extension enables us to directly address the existence of social network eects
and the net eect of mobility, as laid out in Section 3.20
6.1 Principal results
From the results contained in Table 2, we infer the validity of our main theoret-
ical hypotheses regarding mobility. In doing so we control for other important
20For hypotheses with a denite sign prediction, such as Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3, we apply one-sided t-tests
and present the respective p-values. If there is no sign prediction, we apply two-sided t-tests and report
the corresponding p-values.
14
determinants of patenting, including the size and composition of the R&D work-
force of the rm, its capital stock, sectoral and regional characteristics as well
as unobserved heterogeneity and possible state dependence in patenting.
The results without dierentiation by patenting status show that the share
of R&D joiners in a rm is positively and statistically signicantly related to
patenting activity when compared to the base category of workers, R&D stayers.
The same holds for R&D graduates. The eects for other R&D worker groups
are statistically insignicantly dierent from that of R&D stayers.
The results for the dierentiated specication show that it is both the joiners
from patenting rms and from non{patenting rms who are positively related
to patenting activity. We nd a positive dierence between the eects of moves
that involve a patenting rm over moves from a non-patenting rm. A similar
dierence is found when dierentiating by patenting status of the new rm for
leavers. Simplifying the model to the specication with no dierentiation by
patenting status is strongly rejected (p-value 0.012), which is why we prefer
the more general model in the following. There is still no statistically signi-
cant dierence between either R&D support workers or joiners with unknown
employment history compared to R&D stayers.
Our results regarding joiners from rms immediately lead to our rst main
conclusions. There is a positive eect on patenting of joiners in general (p-value
0.000, one-sided). Moreover, there also is an additional positive eect when
joiners come from a previously patenting rm (p-value 0.048, one-sided). These
ndings support our Hypothesis 1.
Turning to the evidence on Hypothesis 2 regarding leaver eects, the coe-
cient of leavers who have left for a rm that has previously patented is positive
and even signicantly larger than the eect of the base category of stayers
(p-value 0.006). Leavers to non-patenting rms, on the other hand, have no
signicant eect on current patent output of their previous employer (p-value
0.193). We take the nding of a positive and signicant (p-value 0.004, one-
sided) dierence between the eects of leavers to patenting and non-patenting
rms as evidence for the existence of a positive reverse knowledge eect, thus
conrming our Hypothesis 2.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 combines the joiner and leaver eects to determine the
eect of mobility on the joint level of invention of the rms involved. There are
four possible combinations depending on the patenting status of the old rm of
joiners and the new rm of leavers, respectively. We determine the statistical
signicance of the joint eect for each case by adding the coecients of the
respective types of joiners and leavers. For the case where a non-patenting rm
is involved on both sides, we estimate a joint invention eect that is positive
albeit insignicant (p-value 0.305, one-sided). If the joiner comes from a patent-
ing rm whereas the leaver goes to a non-patenter, the eect becomes larger and
borderline signicant (p-value 0.044, one-sided). For those cases where leavers
move to a patenting rm, we nd large positive and strongly signicant eects
(p-value 0.000, one-sided), irrespective of the origin of joiners. These results are
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strongly suggestive of an overall positive joint eect of mobility on the level of
invention of the rms involved. We nd the positive joint eect to be strength-
ened if either of the rms involved have previously patented. These ndings
support our main Hypothesis 3.
To sum up, Table 2 shows that increases in the number of joiners from either
type of rm, in the number of graduates and in the number of leavers who have
joined a patenting rm, are positively correlated with own patenting activity.
It also indicates the importance of both forward and reverse knowledge ows.
We also nd strong evidence for overall positive eects of labor mobility on the
level of invention of the rm.
Insert Table 2 about here.
6.2 Marginal eects
To study the absolute magnitude of eects, we interpret our empirical ndings
in terms of marginal eects in Table 3. The marginal eect is the absolute
change in the number of patents due to an increase in the number of workers
from skill group r by one worker. It depends both on the coecient estimates,
the number of workers in each of the worker groups, and the number of patents.
The marginal eects are larger the more patents are applied for per R&D worker
(compare Appendix D). We evaluate the marginal eects at the averages across
(i) all observations and (ii) rms with at least one pre{sample patent.
We nd that an increase in the number of joiners from patenting rms by
one is related to an increase in the number of patents by 0.015 when evaluated
for the average of all observations in our sample. This seems like a relatively
large eect when compared to the average number of patent applications per
year in our sample of 0.064 (compare Table 1). However, the average number
of joiners from patenting rms is 0.1 and as many as 79 percent of rms do not
employ any worker of this type. Hiring one worker of this type hence implies
a large change for most rms in our data. When evaluated for an average pre-
sample patenter, the corresponding marginal eect of joiners from patenting
rms is 0.034 patents per additional worker against a sample average of 0.76
patent applications per year.
Insert Table 3 about here.
We nally evaluate the joint eects of leavers to and joiners from rms in
terms of marginal changes in Table 4. The idea here is to consider the thought
experiment of substituting a worker who has left the rm in the previous period
with one who joins the rm. This is somewhat similar to our discussion of
Hypothesis 3 at the end of Section 6.1, with the main dierence being that
the section referred to relative sizes of coecient estimates while the following
paragraphs provide quantitative estimates for the mapping between exchanges
of dierent types of mobile workers.
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We calculate the net eect for joiners who join from patenting and from non{
patenting rms in combination with leavers who have left for patenting rms
or for non{patenting rms. Specically, we add the marginal eect of a joiner
and the marginal eect of a leaver. For example, the total eect of replacing
one worker who leaves for a patenting rm by one joiner from a patenting rm
is 0.015+0.007=0.022 patents (compare Table 3) across all rms. For rms
with at least one pre{sample patent, the same type of substitution yields 0.05
additional patents.
For all leaver/joiner combinations, and for both the full sample and for pre-
sample patenters, we nd positive mobility eects: all types of switches between
dierent types of labor lead to additional patents. The marginal eects are
statistically signicant except for the combination of joiners from and leavers
to non-patenting rms.
Insert Table 4 about here.
6.3 Other results
Table 2 also shows that there is substantial positive state dependence in patent-
ing activity. Firms with patenting activity in the previous period have a much
higher probability to patent again in the current period. This may reect sunk
costs associated with learning about conducting successful research and, more
practically, ling a successful patent application.
Our correction for unobserved heterogeneity also has a signicantly positive
impact. An increase in the number of pre{sample patents by one percent is
associated with an increase in the number of current patents by around 0.3
percent. Both the capital stock and the number of R&D workers are positively
associated with the number of patents in year t. The respective elasticities are
0.135 and 0.314.
The year dummies and the sector dummies are statistically highly signicant,
while the region dummies are statistically insignicant: this implies that there
are no regional dierences in patenting activity once it is controlled for state
dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and other patent production factors.
6.4 Alternative interpretations
We nd our empirical results to be consistent overall with the hypotheses that
we forwarded in Section 3. This of course does not rule out alternative ex-
planations. One potential concern would be that causality ran in the opposite
direction of what is assumed in our theoretical discussion. On the side of the
joiners, if ideas were perceived inside the rms, and then workers were hired to
transform - more or less mechanically - the ideas into patentable inventions, a
positive correlation between the number of joiners and rms' patenting could
result without any ow of knowledge taking place between rms. Furthermore,
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the workers hired to implement the ideas would acquire knowledge that they
could share with their former colleagues, explaining the positive leaver eect. It
must be noted that the leaver eect would still represent a knowledge ow that
would increase the joint level of invention of the rms involved in the mobility
event.
The equivalent interpretation on the side of the leavers seems less plausi-
ble. Suppose, say, that a rm reached the end of its technology life-cycle and
stopped patenting while laying o R&D workers. This would result in a neg-
ative correlation between the number of leavers and patenting, not a positive
one as found in our analysis.
In our theory development, we abstract from potential selection of R&D
workers with dierent unobserved ability or human capital endowment into
dierent types of rms. The main concern here is that rms with the best
conditions for research may attract the best R&D workers, so-called \positive
assortative matching". In order to assess the empirical importance of this ar-
gument, one could - in the spirit of using pre-sample patenting as a proxy
of unobserved dierences in rms' ability to innovate - consider the previous
patenting activity of a rm to indicate its inherently unobservable \research
conditions". Joiners from rms with past patenting activity would be on av-
erage of higher ability than joiners from rms with no past patenting activity.
This could explain at least part of the dierence that we observe between join-
ers from these two types of rms under this interpretation. A similar argument
should then apply to the leavers' side as well, which would reinforce our nding
of reverse knowledge ows. Leavers to rms with previous patenting activity
would then be on average of higher ability and the rm would suer a greater
loss of human capital for this group than for leavers to rms with no previ-
ous patenting. Given that we nd a positive eect on current patenting in the
former case and a zero or slightly negative eect for the latter, the estimated
dierence would then constitute a lower bound on the eect of reverse knowl-
edge ows. Hence, selection may upwardly (downwardly) bias our results on
joiners (leavers) from (to) rms with previous patenting activity. Nevertheless,
even if selection would account for the full dierence between the two types of
joiners, the sum of the joiner and the leaver eects remains positive, resulting
in a positive eect of labor mobility on the joint level invention as posited by
Hypothesis 3.
6.5 Robustness checks
We conduct two robustness checks. First, we weight our dependent variable, the
count of the number of patents of rm i at time t, by the number of citations a
patent receives. By doing this, we attempt to account for the value of patents.
As a second check, we lag the labor mobility variables by two periods instead
of one, since it may take more than one year for joiner and leaver eects to
materialize.
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Citation weights
The distribution of the economic and technological value of patents is heavily
skewed in the sense that few patents have a very high value while the bulk of
patents has very little value, as discussed, e.g., by Harho et al. (1999); Lanjouw
et al. (1998), and Hall et al. (2005). Trajtenberg (1990) shows that there is a
close relationship between the number of citations a patent receives (\forward
citations") and the social value of the invention in the computer tomography
industry. Thus, he suggests approximating value by patent forward citations
since they capture the enormous heterogeneity in the\quality" or \importance"
of patents. Like Trajtenberg (1990), we weight each patent by one plus the
number of citations the patent received within a three{year period after the
EPO publication. Our patent citation data stem from the \EPO/OECD patent
citations database" which is available from the OECD (Webb et al., 2005) and
covers the period 1978{2006.
The left-hand part of Appendix E presents estimation results with citation
weights. The coecient estimates dier only slightly between the citation{
weighted results and results for the unweighted specications in Table 2.
Two year lags
The right-hand part of Appendix E contains estimation results with two lags on
the R&D worker share variables as well as on the total number of R&D workers.
Using two lags instead of one lag only implies that we lose one year of data for
each rm, which leaves us with 32,182 observations on 12,481 unique rms.
Considering two lags instead of one makes some of our estimated eects
stronger, most notably the eect of joiners from patenting rms. The leaver
eects to patenting and non-patenting rms become less positive and more
negative, respectively. The joint mobility eect for joiners from and leavers to
non-patenters is now slightly negative, although insignicantly so.
All qualitative results including our conclusions on the three main hypotheses
therefore remain when we extend the model using longer lags. The results
also further reinforce our argument that reverse causality may not be a major
concern here.
7 Conclusions
This paper assesses the quantitative importance of inter-rm mobility of labor
for invention, using a data set that combines patent applications by Danish rms
to the European Patent Oce with matched employer{employee register data
that track the employment history of R&D workers across time. We estimate
the eect of labor mobility on the inventive activity by both the new and the
old employer.
For the average rm with at least one patent prior to 1999, when our data
set begins, a worker joining from a patenting rm is associated with an increase
in the number of patent applications of 0.034 by the new employer, and a
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worker coming from a non-patenting rm is associated with an increase of 0.022
patent applications. Turning to worker exit, we nd that a worker leaving
for a patenting rm is associated with an increase in the number of patent
applications of 0.016 by the old employer. We explain this by mobility creating
new ties in the social network: employees who have left stay in touch with
their former colleagues and exchange information about their present research.
There is no signicant eect on invention by the old employer associated with
a worker leaving for a non-patenting rm.
Summing up these eects, we nd that labor mobility is related to a positive
and both economically and statistically signicant increase in the joint invention
by the old and the new employer. The eect on joint invention is strongest for
mobility between two patenting rms (0.05) and insignicantly positive for mo-
bility between two non-patenting rms (0.011). These are notable results that
provide a \missing link" in the literature between the rm-level and regional
eects of labor mobility on invention.
Saxenian (1994) has forcefully argued that \job-hopping" is the key to the
success of Silicon Valley by spurring knowledge sharing, innovation and, thus,
the competitiveness of the local rms. Nevertheless, the reasons for the unusual
high labor turnover in Silicon Valley remain controversial. Saxenian attributes it
to an open business culture whereas Gilson (1999) stresses the weak enforcement
of covenants not to compete in California. Marx et al. (2009) use an - apparently
inadvertent - reform of the legal enforcement of covenants not to compete in
Michigan as a natural experiment to study the eect of such covenants on labor
mobility. In line with the arguments of Gilson, Marx et al. nd that covenants
not to compete do indeed restrict labor mobility. Our results would suggest
that the Michigan reform is likely to have reduced invention, at least in the
short-term. At the same time, our results add to this debate by showing that
covenants not to compete are likely not only to reduce the aggregate level of
invention, but also the invention of the rms imposing them. The reason for this
is that rms restricting the outward mobility of their workers benet less from
reverse knowledge ows, suggesting that covenants not to compete should be
used selectively and to protect key knowledge only. Franco and Mitchell (2008),
as well as Krakel and Sliwka (2009), argue that covenants not to compete may
in fact increase innovation by stimulating rms' R&D investments - an issue
that touches upon a limitation of our work. In the empirical analysis, rms
are compared that are observationally equivalent, except with respect to the
mobility of their workforce. Since these rms are likely to face very similar labor
market conditions, it is not possible to identify how dierences in the general
level of labor turnover - e.g., due to dierent enforcement of covenants not to
compete - aect rms' R&D investments. Here, there are likely to be opposing
eects: high mobility increases appropriability hazards (reducing the return
on R&D investment) but facilitates access to knowledge inputs (increasing the
return on R&D investment). Interestingly, Samila and Sorensen (2011) nd
that the former eect dominates and that covenants not to compete tend to
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impede entrepreneurship and employment growth.
There are several interesting research questions that could be pursued in
future works. Our analysis looks at all workers who possess sucient formal
qualications (and job descriptions) to perform R&D tasks, whereas most other
studies have looked at highly productive inventors in the semiconductor indus-
try. Several countries have register data similar to the data that we use, and it
would be very interesting to link inventors to register data in order to track the
mobility of inventors and to measure their importance for invention relative to
other workers. We have only looked at mobility between private rms in this
analysis, but another interesting question is how the mobility between univer-
sity and private rms aects the knowledge production in these two sectors, as
measured by patents and academic publications.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
All Observations with Observations without
observations pre{sample patent pre{sample patent
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
# patent applications t 0.064 1.143 0.761 3.900 0.015 0.535
Dummy patent t  1 0.019 | 0.209 | 0.005 |
R&D worker shares
Joiners from patenting rms 0.012 0.082 0.020 0.078 0.011 0.082
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.067 0.205 0.056 0.138 0.068 0.209
Graduates 0.022 0.115 0.021 0.078 0.022 0.117
Other joiners 0.026 0.137 0.017 0.086 0.027 0.140
Stayers 0.416 0.422 0.463 0.323 0.412 0.428
Support workers 0.458 0.441 0.423 0.337 0.460 0.447
Leavers to patenting rms 0.015 0.091 0.032 0.110 0.013 0.090
Leavers to non{patenting rms 0.077 0.245 0.076 0.188 0.077 0.249
Capital and R&D labor
Total R&D workers 7.568 44.523 38.895 140.269 5.349 25.602
Capital stock (in mio. DKK) 78 1,280 399 2,520 55 1,140
Year dummies (base: 2000)
2001 0.203 | 0.206 | 0.202 |
2002 0.196 | 0.202 | 0.196 |
2003 0.187 | 0.190 | 0.187 |
2004 0.183 | 0.181 | 0.183 |
Sector dummies (base: wholesale and retail trade) | |
Farm & food 0.016 | 0.019 | 0.016 |
Textiles & paper 0.041 | 0.036 | 0.041 |
Chemicals 0.014 | 0.054 | 0.011 |
Plastic & glass 0.026 | 0.072 | 0.023 |
Metals 0.049 | 0.084 | 0.047 |
Machinery 0.069 | 0.233 | 0.057 |
Electronics 0.030 | 0.067 | 0.028 |
Instruments 0.018 | 0.063 | 0.015 |
Vehicles 0.007 | 0.021 | 0.006 |
Furniture 0.016 | 0.021 | 0.016 |
IT & telecom 0.070 | 0.035 | 0.072 |
Technical services 0.140 | 0.127 | 0.141 |
Business{related services 0.095 | 0.044 | 0.099 |
Other 0.180 | 0.023 | 0.191 |
Region dummies (base: Capital region) | |
Zealand 0.097 | 0.088 | 0.098 |
Southern 0.224 | 0.237 | 0.223 |
Central 0.207 | 0.196 | 0.208 |
Northern 0.074 | 0.090 | 0.073 |
Pre{sample variables
# pre{sample patents 0.031 0.557 0.468 2.120 0 0
Dummy pre{sample patents 0.066 | 1 | 0 |
# obs. 42,507 2,811 39,696
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the entire set of observations, for observations with a pre{sample
patent and for those without a pre{sample patent. \SD" denotes the respective standard deviation.
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Table 2: NegBin pre-sample mean estimation results
Without controls for With controls for
patenting status patenting status
of old/new employer of old/new employer
Coecient p{value Coecient p{value
R&D worker shares
Joiners 1.010 0.000 | |
... from patenting rms | | 1.465 0.000
... from non{patenting rms | | 0.852 0.002
Graduates 1.084 0.004 1.101 0.003
Other joiners 0.673 0.122 0.685 0.115
Support workers -0.119 0.572 -0.133 0.526
Leavers -0.082 0.781 | |
... to patenting rms | | 0.808 0.006
... to non{patenting rms | | -0.588 0.193
Capital and total R&D workers
ln(R&D workers) 0.307 0.000 0.314 0.000
ln(capital stock) 0.135 0.000 0.135 0.000
Lagged dependent and pre{sample variables
Dummy patent t  1 1.493 0.000 1.482 0.000
ln(FE) 0.321 0.000 0.315 0.000
FE dummy 0.340 0.145 0.334 0.150
Tests for joint signicance Test statistic p{value Test statistic p{value
Worker shares 30.55 0.000 46.97 0.000
Year dummies 9.77 0.044 9.97 0.041
Sector dummies 75.85 0.000 75.48 0.000
Region dummies 2.17 0.705 2.03 0.730
Pre{sample variables 55.54 0.000 52.69 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3581 0.3590
Table 2 displays NegBin PSME regression results. The estimations involve 42,507 observations on 14,516
unique rms, 2,728 patents and 390 unique patenting rms. Patent citation weights have not been applied.
p-values are based on clustered standard errors.
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Table 3: Marginal eects
Marginal eects across...
...rms
with pre{
sample
. . . all rms patent
ME p{value ME p{value
Joiners from patenting rms 0.015 0.000 0.034 0.000
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.010 0.000 0.022 0.000
Graduates 0.012 0.000 0.027 0.000
Other joiners 0.008 0.020 0.019 0.023
Support workers 0.001 0.180 0.003 0.245
Stayers 0.002 0.018 0.005 0.018
Leavers to patenting rms 0.007 0.006 0.016 0.006
Leavers to non{patenting rms -0.005 0.193 -0.011 0.193
Table 3 displays the marginal eects of dierent types of workers and across alternative types of rms.
It is based on the estimation results for the specication with controls for patenting status of old/new
employer presented in Table 2. Marginal eects are evaluated at the sample means of the involved
variables. Reading example: one additional joiner from a patenting rm is related to 0.015 additional
patents (marginal eect). The gure is statistically highly signicant (p{value 0.000).
28
Table 4: Joint mobility eects
Left for Left for
patenting non{patenting
rm rm
ME p{value ME p{value
All observations
Joiners from patenting rms 0.022 0.000 0.010 0.012
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.017 0.000 0.005 0.223
Observations with pre{sample patent
Joiners from patenting rms 0.050 0.000 0.023 0.014
Joiners from non{patenting rms 0.038 0.000 0.011 0.251
Table 4 displays marginal eects for joint mobility under dierent scenarios. These calculations are based
on the estimation results displayed in Table 2. Reading example: the replacement of one R&D worker
who has left for a patenting rm by a joiner previously employed by a patenting rm is associated with an
increase in the number of patents by 0.022 across all rms. For rms with at least one pre{sample patent,
this relates to an increase in the number of patents by 0.050.
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Appendix A: Production function derivation
The Cobb{Douglas function implicitly assumes that rms never have zero
quantities of an input, because all inputs are multiplied. Dividing labor into
dierent types makes this assumption unlikely to hold in the present sample
with many small rms included. To be able to apply a Cobb{Douglas func-
tion without forcing output to zero for many rms, we need to assume perfect
substitution between the dierent types of labor inputs. However, as long as
we assume separability between a relative homogenous set of labor inputs, here
R&D employment, we consider this assumption to be reasonable.
An additive specication of the quality{adjusted labor input assuming that
R&D workers are perfectly substitutable inputs is given by:
QL = LSt + JLJ + OLO + GLG + SuLSu + PLP
= L

1 + (J   1) LJ
L
+ (O   1) LO
L
+ (G   1) LG
L
+ (Su   1) LSu
L
+ X
LX
L

This includes both leaver eects and eects of workers presently in the rm.
The worker groups are denoted St for stayers, J for joiners from rms, O for
other joiners, Su for support workers, and X for leavers. It is straightforward
to extend the model with terms that dierentiate joiners and leavers according
to patenting status.
The marginal productivity of LSt is normalized to unity in this equation. For
the shares of R&D workers currently in the rm, the coecients (r   1) ; r =
J;O;G; Su;measure the relative productivity dierentials between an additional
worker and an R&D stayer. For leavers, the coecient X measures their patent
productivity relative to the eect of stayers.
Taking logs, using the approximation that ln (1 + z)  z for small z and sub-
stituting for QL, we obtain a log{linear specication of the patent production
function:
P = exp

ln (A) +  ln (K) +  ln (L) +  (J   1) LJ
L
+ (O   1) LO
L
+  (G   1) LG
L
+  (Su   1) LSu
L
+ X
LX
L

In a nal step to derive estimating equation (1), we dene r = (r  1); r =
J;O;G; Su; and sr = Lr=L for the shares of R&D workers in the rm. Sim-
ilarly for leavers, X = X , and sX denotes the ratio of leavers to current
employment.
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Appendix B: Trend Correction of the PSME
We extend the pre-sample mean estimator of Blundell et al. (1995) in allowing
for aggregate trends.
Let TP denote the number of pre{sample observations on the dependent
variable. Pit denotes the number of patent applications. We dene our weighted
proxy variable for rm{specic xed eects, FEi, by
FEi =
1
TP
TPX
t=1
PitP
j2A Pjt
where A denotes the set of all rms potentially applying for patents.
Essentially, by using this extension we allow for general business cycle eects,
the general propensity of rms to patent (vs. secrecy), the propensity of Danish
rms to patent at the EPO, etc., to vary over time.
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Appendix C: Correlation table
J. from J. from Other
pat. rms non-pat. rms joiners Grad. Supp.
Joiners from pat. rms 1
Joiners from non{pat. rms -0.019 1
Other joiners -0.015 -0.035 1
Graduates -0.008 -0.024 -0.018 1
Support workers -0.105 -0.266 -0.169 -0.158 1
Leavers to pat. rms 0.065 0.032 0.013 0.034 -0.082
Leavers to non{pat. rms 0.019 0.088 0.051 0.061 -0.173
ln(total R&D workers) 0.029 -0.011 -0.042 0.012 -0.078
ln(cap. stock) 0.014 -0.031 -0.053 -0.027 0.100
Dummy patent t  1 0.038 0.001 -0.012 0.011 -0.029
ln(FE) 0.030 -0.011 -0.016 0.002 -0.028
FE dummy 0.027 -0.014 -0.018 -0.001 -0.021
L. to L. to ln(total R&D Lag
pat. rms non pat. rms workers) ln(cap. stock) patent ln(FE)
Joiners from pat. rms
Joiners from non{pat. rms
Other joiners
Graduates
Support workers
Leavers to pat. rms 1
Leavers to non{pat. rms 0.049 1
ln(total R&D workers) 0.057 0.035 1
ln(cap. stock) 0.022 -0.008 0.395 1
Dummy patent t  1 0.033 -0.009 0.267 0.151 1
ln(FE) 0.054 -0.003 0.358 0.226 0.4678 1
FE dummy 0.052 -0.001 0.320 0.218 0.375 0.901
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Appendix D: Marginal eects
The marginal eect | the absolute change in the number of patents related to
a change in the number of workers of group r by one | is obtained by partially
dierentiating the patent production function (1) with respect to worker group
r.
For the workers presently in the rm (except stayers), namely groups J , O,
G and Su, the marginal eects are:
@E[P ]
@Lr
= E[P ]
L
(+ r  Pj2J;O;G;Su jsj   XsX):
For stayers, St, the same expression applies noting that St = 0 by the normal-
ization adopted here.
For the leavers, there are no eects via total employment, and we thus have
the following simple expression for the marginal eects:
@E[P ]
@LX
= E[P ]
L
X
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Appendix E: Robustness checks
Citations-weighted Two-time lagged variables
Coecient p{value Coecient p{value
R&D worker shares
Joiners from patenting rms 1.606 0.000 2.108 0.000
Joiners from non{pat. rms 0.917 0.001 0.746 0.020
Graduates 1.116 0.003 1.044 0.007
Other joiners 0.712 0.103 1.121 0.010
Support workers -0.096 0.634 0.158 0.495
Leavers to patenting rms 0.763 0.011 0.685 0.085
Leavers to non{patenting rms -0.627 0.168 -0.813 0.074
Capital and R&D labor
ln(R&D workers) 0.299 0.000 0.319 0.000
ln(capital stock) 0.140 0.000 0.137 0.001
Lagged dependent and pre{sample variables
Dummy patent t  1 1.433 0.000 1.571 0.000
ln(FE) 0.339 0.000 0.305 0.000
FE dummy 0.361 0.161 0.466 0.095
Pseudo R2 0.328 0.370
Number of observations 42,507 32,182
Number of rms 14,516 12,481
The table displays NegBin PSME regression results for the number of patent applications
weighted by citations within three years (left-hand part of table) and two-time lagged vari-
ables (right-hand part of table). The specication estimated is otherwise identical to the one
in the main results table, Table 2.
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